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“Syria’s democratic forces” turn their areas into a ” point transit” for members of the ISIS to the world

by admindiaa

Where did the Islamic State Organization go? What about its leaders and its immigrant members? Is it reasonable that the 90,000 fighters who were declared by the West when talking about the number of fighters of the organization, all killed? Or did they suddenly evaporate with “capable power”?
Questions come to the minds of those who follow the Syrian and Iraqi neighbors over the past few years, some of whom were surprised to announce the end of the organization with a “jar of pen” .. without the effort to convince the advertiser to follow how and when and where this organization ended ?.
The “Euphrates Post” network After the efforts of its correspondents in the field and the follow-up of its sources and monitoring on the ground, I was able to get answers to some of the previous questions, and documented many of them, will be published successively, but what is the summary?
The information we have obtained confirms that the areas of control of the Syrian Democratic Forces inside Syrian territory were the secret in the disappearance of the organization’s soldiers. The transit station, through which members of the organization managed to reach other Syrian regions, Especially Europe, through Turkey.The story of the “evaporation” of “Da’ash” members begins from the areas they control during the past few months, after the Syrian Democratic Forces militia opened a smuggling route for members of the organization and their families to their areas through Badia Abu Khashab (70 km northwest of Deir al-Zour) It is about 17 km from the Euphrates River.According to Euphrates Post, the members of the ISIS who reached the areas controlled by the “Syrian Democratic Forces” are local fighters. These militias have assigned a number of them to their ranks (former fighters in the Free Army or Nasra Front before their allegiance to the organization) , To achieve several goals, perhaps the most important to fill the numerical shortage suffered, in addition to being those of the Arab component that they need to feed “clan strife” in the region.
As an example, one of the leaders of the field-federations (from the sons of Shaitat clan, whose name we are not mentioned) was appointed. They also placed 3 sons of Khasham and others from the various Deir Ezzor clans, And the participants in the crimes and massacres committed by the organization against their sons clans
According to our sources in this context, the placement and acceptance of these was through the Kurdish intelligence “Asayish”, and some of them were recruited to work as security without involvement in military battles.
It is worth mentioning that the recruitment of local ISIS fighters to the SDF was not for all the members who arrived in the latter’s territory. There were other instances of elements who refused to fight within their ranks, preferring to remain in the Deir Ez-Zour or Hassakeh villages under the control of SDF, , And our sources assume that these are under the eyes of the Kurdish intelligence, and condoning them for the purpose of resorting to them one day, and use them in the forced recruitment campaigns executed by it.
SDF Transit:
The most important aspect of information obtained by Euphrates Post from identical sources indicates that the SDF-controlled areas were not only an “access station” for ISIS fighters but also the role of the transit station through which the leaders and members of the organization Non-Syrian nationalities to the Syrian north, including Turkey and other countries of the world.
The Euphrates Post documented the smuggling of several foreign ISIS fighters into their European countries by following a single method of paying a large sum of money to a client of the Kurdish leadership of the SDF, which in turn ensures that the element reaches other people in the north Syria, which is under the control of the factions of the “Euphrates Shield” supported by Turkey, and then to Turkey, and then travel with false passports prepared in advance to the state to which he belongs.
According to the information on some cases that succeeded in the smuggling of owners, the cost of smuggling is very high and amounts to tens of thousands of dollars, and may amount to $ 100 thousand per person, if the former field leaders of the ISIS.
It is worth mentioning that smuggling cases are not only for Arab and foreign members of the organization, but for the smuggling of their family members, and the latest documented information, the smuggling of two sons of a field leader (who preferred to stay in Deir -Ezzor) to Saudi Arabia after crossing from The “Euphrates Shield”, and then to Turkey, and then to Saudi Arabia with a relative who was waiting for them in Istanbul, through forged passports.
Specialized offices .. !!
All the data indicate that the money and the huge amounts of money held by non-Syrian members and leaders are the most important reason for cooperating with the SDF (mostly Arabs and not Kurds) who contribute to their smuggling, as well as their peers in the ” Armor of the Euphrates “collaborators with the military leadership of the opposition factions, especially since the amounts paid are very large, and in return, the numbers of those who wish to pay back to their home country is not a few.
Paradoxically, smuggling is now more organized, similar to its current mode, as was the case with some Syrian refugees on their journey to Europe. How so?
Who wants to leave the areas of control calling to his Arab or foreign country, and after arriving in areas of the “armor of the Euphrates,” locks the price of smuggling to the guarantor, or the so-called “Office of the mediator,” so that the payment is not paid to the smuggler

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